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Abstract. A scale of globalisation is witnessed in the present case study as exemplified by (1) 
the transformation of the role of precedents; (2) the multicultural and multifactorial search for a 
common solution instead of any law-based administration of justice; (3) dissolving definition 
by and conclusion from the law in the name of a legal socio-positivist approach; accompanied 
with (4) some new prerogatives acquired by courts through a) unfolding statutory provisions 
through principles in judicial actualisation, (b) constitutionalisation of issues, as well as c) the 
Supreme Court imposing upon the nation as its supreme moral authority. In both cases, the 
main point is to re-consider the law’s normative material in a way somewhat released from 
nationally positivated self-restriction when searching for a kind of trans-national cultural 
community. By gradually eliminating the law’s substantivity, legal self-identity is mostly 
preserved in a rather procedural sense.  
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Canada has not been treated well by legal comparatists up to the present day. 
Compendious works like the mapping of the legal world by René David, Rudolf 
B. Schlesinger or, from among present-day authors, by, e.g., Michael Bogdan,1 
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1
 David, R.: Les grands systèmes de droit contemporaines (Droit comparé), Paris, 1964. 
630 pp. [Précis Dalloz]; Schlesinger, R. B.–Baade, H. W.–Damaska, M. R.–Herzog, P. E.: 
Comparative Law. Cases–Text–Materials, 5th ed. [1950], Mineola, N. Y., 1988. liii + 923 
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do not, apart from a few commonplaces, devote much attention to it either. In 
textbooks, Canada is usually characterised—perhaps to even further emphasise 
the peripheric or downright provincial role attributed to it anyway—by some 
simple stereotypes according to which the largest part of the area, once 
developed under British influence, unified later on in a federation, while 
Quebec could retain its French law from 1663 until today. Its geographical 
location neighbouring the United States has all along—and mainly from 
post-World War II-years (first of all in foreign policy and government 
administration, but sensible in the tone of scholarly and journalistic literature as 
well)—served as a motive to emphasise its sovereignty; albeit, for obvious 
reasons, it can scarcely (and increasingly less) withdraw itself from the 
dominant influence of the adjacent superpower in aspects as philosophical 
orientation, artistic taste, legal patterns and other segments of life.2 Nowadays, 
Canada excels in both high living standard and openly professed 
multiculturalism as one of the most self-confident leading powers of the world. 
 Its law has indeed developed in a periphery. The English-speaking parts of 
the one-time dominion followed the usual development of a British colonial 
empire until the recent past, in both decision-making tradition and partial 
codification.3 The French-speaking part, Quebec, has retained French law 
irrespective of the fact that France renounced its sovereignty already centuries 
ago. The overall legal continuity was interrupted only by the systematic 
codification achieved by Napoleon in France. This explains why the necessity of 
resuming legal contacts was formulated as the reason for preparing and 
promulgating a Code civil de Québec (1866), 62 years after the issuance of Code 
Napoléon. The preamble reads as follows: “the old laws still in force in Lower 
                               
[University Casebook Series]; Bogdan, M.: Comparative Law. Dewenter, 1994. 245 pp. The 
classical work of Schnitzler, A. F.—Vergleichende Rechtslehre. Basel, 1955. xii + 497—is 
genuinely outstanding in giving at least a rough outline (207–208) of the foundations and 
directions Canada’s law has taken throughout history. 
 
2
 Having stayed in Quebec enjoying the hospitality of Professor Melkevik just at the time 
of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, against New York and other US-towns (about to 
leave for Montreal and then for Toronto), I was confronted with the fact that almost all 
important settlements (thus, the residence of the great majority of population) are situated in the 
frontier zone directly bordering on the United States (from West to East, Vancouver, Brandon, 
Fort William, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal and Quebec, while others, like Calgary, 
Regina and Winnipeg, are not farther from the border than a few hundred kilometres either). 
Canada’s population, about the same in size as that of Hungary, can find a living only in this 
extremely narrow zone of the territory ninety times as large as Hungary. At the same time, any 
event and news beyond the strictly local sphere is naturally related to the United States or 
mediated through its channels. 
 
3
 E.g., Criminal Code (1883). 
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Canada are no longer re-printed or commented upon in France, and it is becoming 
more and more difficult to obtain copies of them, or of the commentaries upon 
them.”4 
 Of course, trying to give any rough outline involves the risk of covering up 
details–whereas theoretical dilemmas and structural features can mostly be 
understood precisely from these. The most important feature of the legal map of 
the territory and population of Canada is that the Quebec Act (1774)5 maintains 
the French heritage in property and civil rights, while the English tradition is 
followed in constitutional, administrative and criminal law. In addition, 
English testamentary and land law are extended over English settlements 
and settlers. In general, it provides for English law in commercial lawsuits and 
evidence, and it introduces jury in civil cases.6 Altogether, the French law of 
Lower Canada has been mixed from the beginning, in contrast to the English 
law of Upper Canada: “Quebec enjoys »une dualité de droit commun« and even, 
more structurally, a »bi-systemic legal system«.”7 It is no mere chance that, 
when having travelled to North America and visited courts in Quebec, Alexis 
de Tocqueville was astonished at the vast variety of languages and traditions 
used in jurisdiction. (In addition, we may add, he found the French language 
used there very old-sounding and outdated as regards both pronunciation and 

 
4
 Cf., e.g., Baudouin, L.: Les apports du Code civil de Québec. In: Canadian Juris-
prudence. The Civil Law and Common Law in Canada (ed.: McWhinney, E.), Toronto,  1958. 
71–89. 
 
5
 14 Geo. III, chap. 83. 
 
6
 I do not deal here with the legal status of the Indian aborigines (including their one-time 
customary law and their present claims), which is becoming topical in Canadian political and 
social public speech and also doctrinal and practical jurisprudence. For a few theoretical 
indications, see, from Melkevik, B.: Question identitaire, le droit et la philosophie juridique 
libérale: Réflexion sur le fond du droit autochtone canadien. Cahiers d’études constitutionelles 
et politiques de Montpellier (1995), No. 1, 23–37, The First Nation and Quebec: Identity and 
Law, Self-affirmation and Self-determination at Crossroads. In: Globalization in America. A 
Geographical Approach (dir. Barbosa, J. S.), Québec, 1997, 95–111 and 246, as well as 
Aboriginal Legal Cultures. In: The Philosophy of Law. An Encyclopedia (ed.: Gray, Ch. B.), 
New York–London, 1999. 1–4. [Garland Reference Library and the Humanities 1743], all 
reprinted in Melkevik, B.: Réflexions sur la philosophie du droit. Québec, 2000, part on 
‘Identité et Droit’, 35–87; and, as practical overviews, also Delgamuukw. The Supreme Court of 
Canada on Aboriginal Title (comm. Persky, S.), Vancouver, British Columbia, 1998. vi + 137 
pp., Isaac, Th.: Aboriginal Law. Cases, Text, Materials and Commentary [1995] 2nd ed., 
Saskatoon, Sask. 1999. xxx + 610 pp. and Macklem, P.: Indigenous Difference and the 
Constitution of Canada. Toronto, 2001. x + 334. 
 
7
 Glenn, H. P.: Quebec: Mixité and Monism. In: Studies in Legal Systems. Mixed and 
Mixing (ed. Örücü, E.–Attwooll, E.–Coyle, S.), The Hague, 5, the first part-quotation by Pigeon, 
L.-P.: Rédaction et interprétation des lois, Québec, 2nd ed. (1978), 50.  
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intonation.8) Well, it was the co-existence of these two great cultures that 
generated, shortly after World War I, the need for Canada to show its own 
singularity by expressing its independent nationhood in and by the law, thereby 
contributing, at least with a symbolic force, to a French-Canadian identity too.9 
 This natural desire for self-determination began to bring its fruits by the 
times around World War II. For instance, in the early 1940s, one reported about 
a growing “prejudice, commencing in the law schools and extending to the 
courtrooms, against the use of American authorities and texts.”10 Then, in a 
few decades, the demand emerged towards “Canadian judges developing 
Canadian law to meet Canadian needs”.11 This era coincided in francophone 
Canada with the period of ambitions for separation also in law, but reflected 
an overall awakening of Canada in every respect. Genuine professors with 
scholarly attitudes, sometimes distinguished and committed to academic 
career, started to appear in law schools, gradually replacing practising judges 
and lawyers having usually shuttled between their offices and the university. 
They already embody a new style, scholarly methodology and theoretical 
sensitivity, able to bring about magisterial works. This way soon trends and 
schools emerge to compete with each other; an independent doctrine is formed 
as developed from the own legal staff; and, from this time on, no longer only 
law claims to embody the nation but also legal scholarship enters the scene to 
become widely acknowledged as an integral part of Canadian public thought, 
intellectual life and internationally acclaimed performance.12 
 The processes–resultants and impacts—are intertwined. What might have 
once seemed to be one of the causes of a peripheral situation, is about to indicate 
today general (further)developmental directions (perspectives and availabilities)—
perhaps not yet in a way obvious for us, as the entire Central and Eastern 
European region is in a flux of constant forming—of universal (or at least global) 
(world)trends. I mean here a kind of inherent lack of originality as one of the 

 
8
 de Tocqueville, A.: Oeuvres complètes. Voyages en Sicile et aux États Unis, t. 5, vol. 1, 
2e éd. Mayer, J.-P., Paris, 1957. 212–213. 
 
9
 “C’est par sa façon d’exprimer le Droit qu’une nation manifeste en partie son 
originalité”—writes Perrault, A. [Pour la défense de nos lois françaises, Montréal, 1919), 8] as 
a programme. 
 
10
 In: Canadian Bar Review 21 (1943), 57. 
 
11
 Read, H.: The Judicial Process in Common Law Canada. Canadian Bar Review 37 
(1959), 268. 
 
12
 As a case study, see, e.g., Normand, S.: Tradition et modernité à la Faculté de droit de 
l’Université Laval de 1945 à 1965. In: Aux frontières du juridique. Études interdisciplinaires sur 
les transformations du droit (dir. Belley, J.-G.–Issalys, P.), Québec, 1993., 137–183. Cf. also 
Melkevik, B.: La philosophie du droit au Québec: développements récents. In: Melkevik, B.: 
Réflexions sur la philosophie du droit. 177–192. 
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features of Canada, deeply rooted in and conditioned by its past. Of course, 
in itself this is but the outcome of historical donnés which—amidst Canada’s 
early by-British and by-French development—did not require or promote own 
solutions to be attained. Although those remote Canadian re-formulations of 
English and French technicalities may have been faint replicas in law, in their 
new medium they were exposed to interact in a depth never experienced by the 
proud and legally chauvin isolationisms of 19th to 20th century England and 
France (sharing maybe one single experience in common, their old disdain 
towards the Germans). What I mean here is the mixing and irreversible inter-
mingling of these laws,13 which, due to the latter’s co-existence and co-operation 
with the knowledge resulting therefrom, offers unprecedented experience 
entitling Canadian lawyers to develop a well-founded self-confidence 
indeed. For such an added and cumulative knowledge can hardly be gained 
otherwise. Notwithstanding, the pluralism of the parts mixed in themselves 
does not inevitably imply the pluralism of the entire structure.14 Accordingly, 
 
“mixed jurisdictions may function as monist jurisdictions. The original 
sources of law may be disparate in character, yet monist, state institutions 
may already have largely completed the task of transfiguration into a 
single, national, systemic structure of law.”15 
 
The process of interaction may have also been accelerated by the unpre-
cedentedly enviable fact that the education of both Common Law and Civil Law 
within the same faculties and offering separate degrees began some decades ago, 
and now also common law is taught in French and vice versa.16 Traditions 
mixed appear also in scholarship with an enhanced interest in both intra- and 
extra-Canadian comparison of laws. A development like this is not simply the 
result of some practical decision. Whether we think of the experience (and 
crucial theoretical message) of the mutual (un)translatability of legal texts 

 
13
 Cf., e.g., Tancelin, M.: Comment un droit peut-il être mixte? In: Le domaine et l’inte-
prétaton du Code Civil du Bas Canada (dir. Walton, F. P.), Toronto, 1980. 1–32. 
 
14
 See, first of all, Rouland, N.: Les droits mixtes et les théories du pluralisme juridique. In: 
La formation du droit national dans les pays de droit mixte. Aix-en-Provence, 1989. 41–55, 
especially 42, quoted by Glenn: ‘Quebec’, 1. 
 
15
 Ibid. 
 
16
 At present, parallel degrees in Civil Law and Common Law can be earned at McGill 
University (Montreal) and the University of Ottawa; the Universities of Ottawa and Moncton 
offer common law programmes in French, while McGill University offers civil law in English. 
Other faculties provide a variety of student exchange programmes, and the federal government 
arranges for inter-Canadian comparative legal studies organised every summer. 
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within the European Union17 or of their commensurability at the intersection of 
diverging legal cultures,18 evidently both refer to the hermeneutic significance 
of the symptom “I interpret your culture through mine” (symbolised by the 
figurative expression of “missionaries in the boat”)19 and, thereby, to the fact 
that, beyond sheer textuality, law is primordially an expression of culture.20 
Accordingly, the use of another language is not simply an issue of translation (or 
communication technique) but the choice of another culture, that is, an issue of 
doing interpretation (re-interpretation) in another—inevitably different—medium. 
 
* 
 
Developments in present-day Canada are of a special interest for us first of all 
because they, with the interaction of two leading European traditions in law, 
highlight mutual influences with the perspective of convergence (which, in view 
of the unificatory civil law codification decided by the European Union, has 
raised the topicality of rapprochement of Common Law and Civil Law and, 
within it, the need for reconsidering the controversy Savigny and Thibaut had in 
18th-century Germany21), and also outline the potentials of development (or of 
possible deformation) in the light of the Canadian experiment with experiences 
lived through. Here I recall again, as the indication of a kind of belated 
development, the specific feature of the Canadian past which I referred to 
earlier as a mere followance of external patterns under peripheric conditions, 
accompanied by a lack of self-reliance. For around the mid-20th century, this 
state of mind was replaced by self-building and self-determination set as a 
new objective. Unbalancedness, swinging into opposites and neophytism 
may accompany the process. Provincial imitation is replaced by autonomous 

 
17
 Cf., e.g., de Groot, G. R.: Recht, Rechtssprache und Rechtssystem: Betrachtungen über 
die Problematik der Übersetzung juristischer Texte. Terminologie et traduction 3 (1991), 279–
312 [abridged transl. In: European Legal Cultures (ed.: Gessner, W.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs.), 
Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney, 1996, para 20, 115–120 {Tempus Textbook 
Series on European Law and European Legal Cultures I}]. 
 
18
 Cf., e.g., from Glenn, H. P.: Commensurabilité et traduisibilité. In: Actes du Colloque 
“Harmonisation et dissonance: Langues et droit au Canada et en Europe (mai 1999)” published as 
a double issue in Revue de la common law 3 (2000) 1–2, 53–66. and Are Legal Traditions 
Incommensurable? The American Journal of Comparative Law XLIX (Winter 2001) 1, 133–146. 
 
19
 Cf. Cohn, B. S.: Anthropology and History: The State of the Play. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 22 (1980), 199. 
 
20
 Cf., from the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. vii + 
279 [Philosophiae Iuris]. 
 
21
 Cf., e.g., from the author: Codification à l’aune du troisème miéllénaire. In: Mélange 
offert au Professeur Paul Amselek. Strasbourg, 2003. [in press]. 
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construction. At the same time, Canada’s economic safety coupled with relative 
political tranquillity and constitutional stability encourages to kinds of 
experimentation which could by far not be available elsewhere (because of 
imperial dimensions or the want of reserves). Moreover, situations brought 
about by chance or provoked by empty slogans may come about due to in-
experience. Needless to say that the final balance will be drawn up by the people 
of Canada. However, for the external observer, all this schemes a path for the 
future. For everything in move in Canada develops in line with dominant ideas 
of our age, mainstream but also self-fulfilling.22  
 In this overview, I undertake to analyse (1) the change in the role precedents 
play in judicial process; (2) the transformation of law-application into a 
collective, multicultural and multifactorial search for finding a practical solution, 
assessable by inter-national standards; (3) the practical trends of dissolving the 
law both in common law and civil law jurisprudence; and, finally, (4) the new 
prerogatives acquired by courts for their own procedure, such as a) the unfolding 
of principles from the statutory provisions, themselves taken as mere guide-
marks for the courts, b) the critical filtering of the entire legal system 
according to the Charters’ human rights by deducing legal solutions directly 
from the constitution and, in conclusion, c) the courts becoming an ultimate 
ethical forum in debated moral issues as well. 
 
 
1. The transformation of the role of precedents 
 
Our thinking may prove to be ahistorical whether or not we realise it. In average 
cases, we tend to take any event as a preliminary by presuming the present to be 
given with frameworks consolidated, and try to analyse and understand anything 
that merely precedes it, by forcing it into a straitjacket often alien and external to 
it, thereby also distorting it. In our present-day legal thought, we tend to 
consider the body of common law and the entire English legal tradition as a 
normative material differing from continental law mostly in methodological 
elaboration, albeit the substantiation (substantivisation) of the decisional patterns 
of English law, developing mainly from the adaptation of forms of action and 
formulated mostly through procedural forms, is only a product of initiatives 

 
22
 One of my vital Canadian sources has been the oeuvre of Glenn, H. P.: Legal Traditions 
of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law, Oxford, 2000. xxiv + 371, a universal overview, 
based upon the generalising re-consideration of his observations built on comparisons focussing 
on Canada. 
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taken in the 19th century and not earlier.23 Moreover, as a result of historical 
reconstruction, we may even declare that practically every feature that had once 
caused the tradition of common law to divert from civil law development has by 
now disappeared from behind the reality of this law over the past one and a half 
centuries. To wit, there are no forms of action in England any more; the 
institution of jury has in the meantime declined; those few ambulant justices 
once wandering all through the kingdom have in the meantime been replaced by 
a judicial moloch with an army of judges; the decisive judicial role of the first 
and last instance declaring what in the case the law is has disappeared from 
this machinery of an enormous hierarchical complexity; the number of cases to 
be heard by a judge has increased sky-high, with litigation having grown to 
massive proportions; the one-time exceptionality of judicial adjudication has 
been degraded into a mere state-provided servicing, and, with the solemnity of 
justice reduced to mere routine, judicature has transformed into case-managing-
adjudication, fulfilled as a task to be administered obligatorily; substantive 
law defining the legal status of behaviours shadows already the once dominant 
procedural approach; and the exclusivity of jurisdiction exercised by a handful 
of elect men is challenged by the inclusion of women and all types of careers 
recruited from fellow-citizens of various colours and cultural backgrounds, 
eligible by mere professional qualification (and ‘learned’ only in this 
respect).24 Even according to the self-portraying of common law, all this has 
resulted in a change of character so that from now on nothing else can identify 
common law than some vague “habit of thought”.25 In the light of our post-
modern and cosmically extended universal expectations of the rule of law’s 
service-providing state and law, it may seem almost bizarre to recall in 
historical contrast that even some centuries ago, the judge was not to decide out 
of duty but occasionally at times when he felt he should indeed do so, because 
he found the parties’ conflict mature and balanced enough in legal positions that 
he might esteem his decision was needed indeed for the dispute to end. That 
means that, in those earlier times, the parties were expected to co-operate in 
reaching a situation somewhat cleared and balanced.26 
 The unification of the judicial system in 19th century England had a series of 
impacts pointing beyond simple institutional rationalisation. In conclusion, also 

 
23
 Glenn, H. P.: La civilisation de la common law. Revue internationale de Droit comparé, 
45 (1993) 3, 559–575. 
 
24
 Cf., e.g., Glenn, H. P.: The Common Law in Canada. The Canadian Bar Review (June 
1995), 261–292. 
 
25
 Lord Oliver of Aylmerton: Requiem for the Common Law. The Australian Law Journal 
67 (1993), 686. 
 
26
 Baker, J. H.: English Law and the Renaissance. Cambridge Law Journal, 44 (1985), 58. 
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the one-time identity of common law was done away with, as precisely the 
rivalling of judicial fora (referring to varying normative sources according to 
differing traditions) had until then defined the identity of English law, across 
more then half a millennium. For the Equity, the Admiralty and the 
ecclesiastical law had equally received and channelled civil law impacts so 
that ideas by Cujas, Pothier and other (mainly French) lawyers could freely 
stream into English law. True, 19th-century England did block this abundant 
source by the said re-organisation of the judiciary. All this notwithstanding, 
common law concepts and institutions could be further fertilised by the English 
interest in German pandectism during the same century.27 
 As to the law’s structure, Blackstone was of the opinion that “human laws 
are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to (divine law and natural 
law)”.28 In fact, the unthinkable dream of a judge making law (i.e., the term 
‘judge-made law’) was only invented by Jeremy Bentham—in 1860.29 Anyway, 
the formal system of precedents with the principle of stare decisis developed 
and solidified around the same time. Judicial law-making has become overtly 
transparent due to the growing resort to the method of distinguishing, while 
courts got accustomed to following earlier and superior decisions. All this 
presumed a renewing approach. For “Cases (…) could not be rules to be followed 
and were hence examples of the type of reasoning which had thus far prevailed 
(…). Since cases only exemplified arguments, there was no closure of sources”.30 
 As known, in England in 1966, the House of Lords had absolved itself 
from the compulsory compliance with its own earlier decisions.31 This soon 
resulted—through the Court of Appeal’s seventeen justices proceeding in 
panels—in what we can now call the practical desuetude of earlier decisions. 
(This same change of direction led to similar absolutions with the Supreme 
Court of Canada and, gradually, with all courts of the provincial Courts of 
Appeal.) All this amounts to an inevitable change in the law’s overall operation. 

 
27
 E.g., Glenn: The Common Law…, 278. Both the rich continental collection of classical 
law libraries (especially of the Inns in London or the Bodleian at Oxford) and John Austin’s 
recurrent visits to Bonn and Berlin may be remembered here. 
 
28
 The Sovereignty of the Law Selections from Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England (ed.: Jones, G.), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1973. 51, note 31. 
 
29
 Evans, J.: Change in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century. In: 
Precedent in Law (ed.: L. Goldstein), Oxford, 1987. 
 
30
 Postema, G. J.: Roots of our Notion of Precedent. In: Precedent in Law, 22. In a similar 
sense, see also Lobban, M.: The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760–1860. Oxford–
New York, 1991. and Lieberman, D.: The Province of Legislation Determined. Legal Theory in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain Cambridge University Press, Cambridge–New York, 1989. 
 
31
 ‘Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)’ Weekly Law Reports 1 (1966), 1234, as well as 
All England Reports 3 (1966), 77. 
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From now on, one has to recognise that decision-making based upon the 
pondering of principles is replaced by a “discretionary dispute resolution 
with a low level of predictability”,32 in which no component can be more than 
“relaxed” and “flexible”.33 The internal order of common law countries comes 
increasingly close to what we have learned so far about their mutually fertilising 
interconnections, taking over solutions from each other with persuasive force.34 
At the same time, “Citation of single cases has been replaced by search and 
citation methods which batch or group large numbers of cases, as indicating the 
drift of decisional law.”35 Accordingly, also syllogisms of law-application 
are substituted by “statistical syllogism”.36 
 Any theoretical formulation of the doctrine of precedent implies the dual 
chance of an ex post facto arrangement with retroactive effect (as an a posteriori 
manifestation or declaration of the law)37 and—in want of any clear formalisa-
bility, due to which “Judges (…) proceeded on the basis of law they felt they 
could reasonably articulate, through a »careful working out of shared under-
standings of common practices«.”38—of social interests being weighed in the 
recourse to distinguishing. Or, the chance of the law and order getting trans-
formed into an open-ending play of social mediation has become actual and 
acute. 
 All this results in a new doctrine of case law with the radical renewal of the 
regulation ideal as well. Accordingly, “The announced rule of a precedent 
should be applied and extended to new cases if the rule substantially satisfies the 
standard of social congruence”.39 This way, Talmudic tradition comes back into 
the tradition of common law with its distrust in logic and theoretical generali-

 
32
 Glenn: The Common Law…, 269–270. 
 
33
 Curtis, G.: Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada. University of British Columbia Law 
Review 12 (1978), 8 and, similarly, Friedmann, W.: Stare Decisis at Common Law and under the 
Civil Code of Quebec. Canadian Bar Review 31 (1953), 723 et seq. 
 
34
 According to Hodgins, J. A.: The Authority of English Decisions. Canadian Bar Review 
1 (1923), 470 et seq., especially 483, borrowing of ideas could always take place in case the 
reasoning was applicable conclusively. K. MacKenzie’s formulation—‘Back to the Future: The 
Common Law and the Charter’ Advocate 51 (1993), 930—is even more laconic on the decline 
of precedent, more rapid in Canada than in England. 
 
35
 Glenn: The Common Law…, 270. 
 
36
 Glenn, H. P.: Sur l’impossibilité d’un principe de stare decisis. Revue de la recherche 
juridique / Droit prospectif,  XVIII (1993) 4, No. 55. 1073–1081, especially 1081. 
 
37
 Gray, J. Ch.: The Nature and Sources of the Law [1921] 2nd. ed., New York, 1948. 168 et 
seq. and 174 et seq. For a more detailed exposition, see, from the author: Ex post facto 
regulation. In: The Philosophy of law. An Encyclopedia (ed.: Gray), 274–276. 
 
38
 Postema: op. cit. 31. 
 
39
 Eisenberg, M.: The Nature of the Common Law. Cambridge, 1988. 154, note 75. 
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sation for moral choices, by considering both thesis and antithesis suitable to 
embody the word of living God.40 Ultimately, the question ‘Is the Common Law 
Law?’ arises. For—as the response holds41— 
 
“Common law rules are a strange breed. They can be modified at the 
moment of application to the case at hand, and their modification depends 
upon the background of social propositions. If (…) a doctrinal proposition 
should be enforced or extended when and only when it is congruent with 
the relevant social propositions, and a doctrinal proposition should be 
discarded or reformulated when it lacks such congruence, then the 
doctrinal proposition seems to be no more than a rule of thumb.” 
 
 
2. The transformation of law-application into a collective, multicultural 
and multifactorial search for a practical solution 
 
The principle of stare decisis has never been accepted in Quebec, although the 
Canadian legal development has always remained open to borrow, especially 
English and French law. This is the reason why it seldom tried to either 
formalise or close down its normative sources. Typically, not even the first 
Quebec Civil Code (1866) did abrogate the previous law and did prohibit 
reference to former decisions as sources of the law. Or, it generously left in 
force from pre-code law anything not in simple repetition of codal wording or 
incompatible with codal provisions, with the effect that “the codification of the 
Quebec laws seems rather like a half-measure, typical of compromise.”42 For it 
is to be remembered that demarcation lines between “us” and “them” have 
always been alien to Canadian tradition. Just as no “formal »adoption«” was 
known there, eventual borrowings were not regarded as “radically »foreign« 
laws” either, since, pragmatically, all “they represent living law which may be 
useful in the practical process of dispute resolution.”43 

 
40
 Stone, S. L.: In Pursuit of the Counter-text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in 
Contemporary American Legal Theory. Harvard Law Review 106 (1993), 813 et seq., especially 
828, and, as built into the philosophical understanding of legal argumentation, cf., from the 
author: Lectures …, 93, note 120. 
 
41
 Schauer, F.: Is the Common Law Law? California Law Review 77 (1989), 455–471, 
quotation on 467. 
 
42
 Code civil de Québec, Art. 2712, and the quotation by Tancelin, M. A.: Introduction. In: 
Walton, F. P.: The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (new ed. 
Tancelin, M. A.), Toronto, 1980. 27. 
 
43
 Glenn, H. P.: Persuasive Authority. McGill Law Journal 32 (1987) 2, 289. 
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 As if learned from the admonitions of the Institutions of Gaius that peoples 
are governed both by law which is particular to them and by law which is 
common to humanity,44 anyway, the normative bases referred to in judicial 
decisions witness a rather open and international auditorium. A recent analysis 
of jurisprudence shows the following proportion of citations 
 
at the Supreme Court of Canada45 
 
to decision to doctrine 
domestic 367 domestic 63 
British 110 British 29 
American 045 American 24 
Australian–Asian 014 French 09 
French 002 Australian–Asian 07 
other 004 other 02 
foreign 175 (32,3%) foreign  71 (53%) 
foreign altogether 36,4 % 
 
in Quebec46
 
 
to local decision 129 
to French author  117 
to common law decision  079 
to local author 029 
to French decision  025 
to common law author 013 
to foreign decisions altogether 44,64% 
to foreign authors altogether 81,76% 
to foreign sources altogether 234  (59,7%) 

 
44
 “Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur partim suo proprio, partim communi 
omnium hominum iure utuntur” in Inst. Gaius 1.1. 
 
45
 Supreme Court Reports 1 (1985), 296. According to another survey, the frequency of cita-
tion of foreign decisions or laws at the Supreme Court of Canada amounts to 24,2–32,7% of all the 
references as compared to other Canadian sources, and as compared to foreign ones (typically 
reference to United States sources in public law, to French ones in cases of Quebec and, in other 
cases, mostly to German and Israeli ones), 18,9–21,8% of all the references. Cf. Glenn, H. P.: The 
Use of Comparative Law by Common Law Courts in Canada. In: The Use of Comparative Law by 
Courts (ed.: Drobnig, U.–van Erp, S.), Dordrecht, 1999., 59–78, especially 68. 
 
46
 Jobin, P.-G.: Les réactions de la doctrine à la création du droit civil québécois par les juges: les 
débuts d’une affaire de famille. Les Cahiers de Droit 21 (1980), 257–275, especially 270.  
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All this means that references to foreign authors are more frequent in all Canada 
and significantly more frequent in Quebec, than to domestic, resp. local ones; 
reference to foreign decisions is made in one third, resp. two fifths of all 
references; altogether, reference to foreign sources is made in one-third, resp. 
three fifths of all references; and finally, in Quebec, the frequency of references 
to foreign decisions is higher by 38,2%, and that to foreign authors by 54,26%, 
than in Canada at large.47 
 Well, at the level of call-words, we may encounter globalised multi-
culturalism perfected. Interestingly enough, something more is also at stake for a 
comparative historical investigation of legal traditions. Repeated experience is 
the case, reminding us that European legal development came about through 
continuous (doctrinal and judicial) re-interpretation of traditions in jus 
commune rather than from oeuvres created in original construction.48 Or, also 
great (English, French, German or American) legal cultures—serving usually as 
standards for us—are in the final analysis nothing but products of trans-national 
learning and mutual borrowing.49 
 Common law as a historical accumulation of precedents is process-like by 
definition: “common law is a developing system in the sense that there is a 
continuing process of development and exposition of rules.”50 For this very 
reason, 
 
“the search for law is too important for any potential external source to be 
eliminated a priori. The law is never definitively given; it is always to be 
sought, in the endlessly original process of resolution of individual 
disputes through law.”51 
 
The feeling of insecurity, the renouncement of any search for law, the wish for 
agreement and legitimation from any source at any price add to the above, as 

 
47
 There is a remarkable contrast here with the United States, asserting itself as open and 
multicultural, where the frequency of citations in one state from another is about 10%, whereas 
from an authority outside the USA is scarcely 1% [Merryman, J.: Toward a Theory of Citations: 
An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 
1970. California Law Review 50 (1977), 394–400], or downright unheard of (0%). In its own 
past, however, this ratio was 25,7% in 1850 and 1% in 1950 [Manz, W.: The Citation Practices 
of the New York Court of Appeals, 1850–1993. Buffalo Law Review 43 (1995), 153]. 
 
48
 Cf. primordially Coing, H.: Handbuch des Quellen und Literatur der neueren 
europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte I, München, 1973. 
 
49
 Glenn: Persuasive Authority, 263. 
 
50
 Jackett, W. R.: Foundations of Canadian Law in History and Theory. In: Contemporary 
Problems of Public Law in Canada (ed.: Lang, O. E.), Toronto, 1968. 29.  
 
51
 Ibid., 293. 
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if inherent scepticism were to be overcome by a rush for substitute to safety. 
After all, the judge “feels much safer if he can rely on foreign jurisprudential 
continuity instead of own sources gained exclusively from the text”.52 
 All in all, new call-words take indeed the lead: diversity, pluralism and 
concurrence—as much in law as in other fields.53 We can be sure that they 
are fulfilled. According to figures, for instance, the safe, foreseeable and 
calculable civil law excels in both client circulation and the queuing for justice 
administered, as well as in mass-scale litigation. Spectacular and frivolous 
lawsuits are more typical in the Anglo–American world—filed out of individual 
rivalry (sometimes represented by gender-, colour- or culture-specific groups), 
of mutual ambition to suppress, to revenge or profit-seeking or business interest 
(e.g., in divorce, for real or alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, medical 
malpractice, or in liability for harms caused by products, etc.)—, albeit all this 
is, due to the complexity of procedure and the costs of lawyer’s fees, only 
available to those in middle-class with balanced financial backgrounds. Any-
way, the number of judges per 100 000 inhabitants is54 
 
in Germany 26 
in France 11 
in Canada 08 
in England 01,9 
 
The data are not only relevant for employment statistics: they speak of the extent 
of actual workload and institutional significance as well. 
 Accordingly, the litigation habit developed in early modern common law 
(with the social exceptionality of a judicial event) is continued. Moreover, from 
the comparative numerical data of the caseload per annum of supreme courts— 
 
Canada Supreme Court 100–150 cases heard 
France Cour de cassation 28 000 decided cases 

 
52
 Baudouin, J.-L. : Le Code civil québécois: crise de croissance ou crise de vieillesse. 
Canadian Bar Review 44 (1966), 406. 
 
53
 Cf., e.g., Villa, V.: La science du droit. Bruxelles–Paris, 1990. 209 pp. (La pensée 
juridique moderne). In Canada, due to inclination towards experiment, differing from the US at 
any price and concentrating in cities, all this can turn into a remarkable driving force. Cf., for 
the symbolic resonance of the concurrence of pluralist diversity in Canadian philosophical life, 
Melillo, R.: Ka-Kanata. Pluralismo filosofico, I–II, S. Michele di Serino. 1990. 165 + 306 pp. 
 
54
 Glenn, H. P.: La Cour Suprême du Canada et la tradition du droit civil. The Canadian Bar 
Review (March–June 2001), 151–170, especially 161. 
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—, it is revealed that two hundreds to two hundreds and fifty times less cases are 
tried in Canada yearly as against, say, the mass-scale caseload in France.55 
 
 
3. Practical trends of dissolving the law 
 
The possibility of a judge becoming his own master by complementing legal 
considerations with social assessment is inherent in the doctrine of precedent. 
Taking, for instance, the dworkinian approach, the differentiation between 
principles and rules and, thereby, the establishment by principles of the 
relevance of rules56 involve already the mixing of purely legal aspects with 
external axiological and social considerations.57 
 This is a complete change in the law’s nature, running against the one-time 
justinian creed, according to which judication has to be based upon not the 
example but the law.58 Now, a conviction according to which it is “closer to the 
truth to regard the law as a continuing process of attempting to solve the 
problems of a changing society, than as a set of rules”59, becomes the deonto-
logical corner-stone of the judging profession. Also a self-reassuring thought 
appears to persuade the sceptics that all this may conform even better with the 
claims of participatory democracy than legal positivism, based upon the alleged 
sovereignty of law. This concept is post-modern, worthy of our brave, new 
world indeed: 
 
“Law is less precise but more communal and there are more possibilities 
of persuasion and adherence to law, and eventually of eliminating it. 
Decisions are less conclusive, other sources may later prevail, and broader 
forms of agreement become possible, tolerant of differences now seen as 
minor and perhaps transient.”60 

 
55
 Ibid., 154. This comparison does not take account of the mass of unsettled cases, the 
number of which has grown by 200.000 in France in one single decade. Tailhades, E.: La 
modernisation de la justice. Rapport au Premier Ministre, Paris, 1985. 36. 
 
56
 Dworkin, R. M.: The Model of Rules. University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967), 14 et 
seq. [reprint: Is Law a System of Rules? In: The Philosophy of Law (ed.: Dworkin, R. M.), 
Oxford, 1977. 38–65]. 
 
57
 Precisely, ‘questions of law’ themselves cannot be anything else than products of an 
abstraction taken out of a merely analytical interest. Cf., from the author: Theory of the Judicial 
Process. The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. vii + 249. 
 
58
 Justinianus (C.7.45.13): “non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est”. 
 
59
 Waddams, S. M.: Introduction to the Study of Law. Toronto, 1979. 5. 
 
60
 Glenn: Persuasive Authority. 297 and 298. 
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From now on, old patterns of institutional development enter again the scene. 
Once the dam breaks, what used to be merely phenomenal becomes essential 
and what was just symptomatic transforms into a programmatic vision about 
the future, forming in the womb of society now. Anyway, this aspiration is 
descriptively formulated, yet fulfils a justificatory function, leaving behind any 
limiting and disciplining framework as an outdated obstacle. The claim for 
innovation is also formulated as a theoretical claim:  
 
“Modern societies have been […] oriented towards the rationalization of 
autonomous fields of social practice, they have raised the problem of the 
unity of social action to the level of a formal, universalizing and abstract 
law, and have understood law as the deduction of an ideal of justice 
characterized by individual freedom. The indeterminate nature of this idea 
of justice, namely the impossibility of deducing some concrete content 
from a principle, has generated a crisis of the power to make law and 
brought about inductive and pragmatic procedures for recognizing the 
rights claimed in social conflicts by various categories of actors.”61 
 
Well, we may freely meditate on the sense of such and similar theses 
reminiscent of the leftist Utopian radicalism of Critical Legal Studies, never-
theless, it is a fact that they are neither exceptional nor unique any longer. What 
they betoken are real alterations in actual practice and factual arrangement. They 
ascertain, for instance, on a theoretical level that 
 
“Two paths of legal development may be envisioned. One involves 
shifting the centre of the legal system away from legislation towards a 
limited set of fluid principles and concepts. The other implies re-
emphasizing legislation as the centre of the system, while rolling back the 
legislative tide and reactivating the symbolic meaning of legislation—
especially through the development of new forms of civic involvement in 
the legislative process.”62 
 
Thus, once the dam breaks, a further recognition (mixed with some neophyte 
haste and hypocrisy) is added to it: of course, all this is true, quite to the extent 

 
61
 Gagné, G.: Les transformations du droit dans la problématique de la transition à la 
postmodernité. Les Cahiers de Droit 33 (septembre 1992) 3, 701–733 and in: Aux frontières du 
juridique. 221–253, abstract, 221. 
 
62
 Issalys, P.: La loi dans le droit: tradition, critique et transformation. Les Cahiers de Droit 
33 (septembre 1992) 3, 665–699 and in: Aux frontières juridiques. 185–219, abstract, 186. 
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that this has never been otherwise either in civil law63 or in codification.64 One 
may have been wrong in the past but now one is certainly right. 
 As the Canadian justice La Forest declared in a recent case, “The legal 
system of every society faces essentially the same problems and solves these 
problems by quite different means, though often with similar results”.65 Well, it 
is precisely the diversity of both the paths of procedure and the instruments 
applied, the sources invoked and the kinds of reasoning resorted to, from among 
which the result of the choice actually done today proves to be quite open-
ending, which may signal the advent of a new era. 
 Though in theoretical veil, it is now declared with brutal openness that “it is 
no longer the legislator with whom the interpreter conducts a dialogue but the 
authorities; namely, the opinions of other learned justices: judges and especially 
famous justices”.66 Actually, hereby, both the subjects and the play, topic, 
purpose and stake of a legal process, as well as the invoked arguments and 
the function of the entire judiciary are changed over. “All the World’s a 
Courtroom”—they shout not quite unfoundedly, heralding a new millennium. At 
once a methodology builds upon the apparent description, explaining that 
 
“The court does not proceed in a purely deductive manner, because the 
available sources or principles are not always clear and complete enough 
to permit deduction. This is wherefrom the dialogical and transnational 
character of civil law arises. The process is not inductive either, because 
no simple multiplication of instances or potential examples is able to lead 
to justification by foundations provided for the resolution of the affair 
before the court. Otherwise, among these extra-frontier sources, the 
court does not cite only judicial decisions. It also has recourse to authors 
expressing opinions and developing principles, just as to laws and codes. 
If this method should be qualified, it can be described as analogical, 

 
63
 “Law is prior to the law (…) law is not entirely included in the law” Rémy, Ph.: Éloge de 
l‘exégese. Revue de la Recherche Juridique / Droit prospectif VII (1982), 261. — “Law is 
variable and diffuse. It is a material to be explored and not to be created.” Mouly, C.: La 
doctrine, source d’unification internationale du droit. Revue internationale du Droit comparé 38 
(1986), 364. — “law is prior to legal rule and overflows it everywhere” Varaut, J.-M.: Le droit 
commun de l’Europe. Gazette du Palais (19–20 September 1986), Doct., 9. — “Law is not 
some kind of construction, but a reality to be explored” Atias, Ch.: Une crise de légitimité 
seconde’ Droits 4 (1986), 32. — “There is no one today to declare [confirming the words of 
Montesquieu] that the judge is nothing else but »the mouth of the law« […] the judge sets up his 
own barriers for himself.” Rigaux, F.: La loi des juges. Paris, 1997. 65 and 247. 
 
64
 [1977] 2 R.C.S. 67, à la p. 76. 
 
65
 Rahey v. The Queen [1987] 1 S.C.R. 598, at 319. 
 
66
 Rémy: op. cit. 260. 
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first of all. By means of this method, one searches for links and common 
elements between the problem to be resolved and the model proposed, 
whatever the institutional source of the latter. (…) The legitimacy of the 
court’s decision depends on the legitimacy of the decision’s sources; 
enlarging these, the range of legitimate decisions is enlarged.” 67 
 
Thereby we seem arrive from common law tradition (having once originated in 
Europe) at a peculiar compound of some Anglo–American Europe. A new kind 
of logic is to correspond to this. In its terms, 
 
“The dialogical principle means that two or more various kinds of 
»logic« are combined into unity in a complex (mutually complementing, 
concurring and antagonistic) manner without duality being lost in this 
unity.”68  
 
One has to note here  that duality may have an additional meaning in relation to 
the specific case of Canada, as it is clearly shown in the Canadian charac-
terisation of methodological novelty: “the jurisprudence of Quebec, especially in 
civil affairs, departs from the model of judicial syllogism, in order to practice the 
discursive and descriptive reasoning, characteristic of common law.”69 This is 
what was recently announced in Canada with a simultaneously reconstructive 
and normative claim, as a legal theory of post-modernism, called legal socio-
positivism.70 The scholarly motive of elevating all this into theoretical heights is 
neutral in itself: apparently it results from the merely sociologically inspired 
approach to and specification of the concept of law,71 however, by extending its 
subject, it also turns the entire conception inside out. Namely, law is not a kind 
of normativity any longer but a mere fact or, more precisely, an aggregate of 

 
67
 Glenn: La Cour Suprême du Canada…, 169. Cf. also Abrahamson, S.–Fischer, M. J.: All 
the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium. Hofstra Law Review 26 (1997), 273 
et seq. 
 68 Morin, E.: Penser l’Europe. Paris, 1987. 28. Quotation by Glenn, H. P.: Harmonization of 
Private Law Rules between Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions. In: Académie internationale 
de droit comparé: Rapports généraux. XIIIe Congrès International, Montréal, 1990. Cowansville, 
Qué, I.C, 79–95, 89, note 29. 
 
69
 Melkevik, B.: Penser le droit québécois entre culture et positivisme: Quelques 
considérations critiques. In: Transformation de la culture juridique québecoise (dir. Melkevik, 
B.) Québec, 1998. 9–21, especially 15. 
 
70
 Ibid., passim. 
 
71
 Rottleuthner, H.: Le concept sociologique de droit. Revue interdisciplinaire d’Études 
juridiques (1992), No. 29, 67–84.  
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facts regarded as legal.72 Or, law embodies a kind of polycentrism by its “inter-
normativity” that mediates—through its network of many actors—between law 
and the axiologism of extra-legal (social, economic, ethical, etc.) norm-systems 
invokeable.73 Otherwise speaking, it is a duality, a compound of “law as a 
socially constructed fact” and “law as a specifically normative fact”.74 As hoped 
for, this is already on the way to dissolve the law’s separation, distinction and 
specificity. Its ideologists are about to take sides. Accordingly, 
 
“We prefer a more integrated approach, one in which law also takes part in 
exercising power and especially state power, and which also allows for the 
constitution and reproduction of social relations and institutions, more-
over, within certain limits, their transformation as well, so that law serves 
as a system of justification in the exercise of power, consequently also as a 
point of reference in the contestation of power (out of which the 
revindication of »rights« may arise).”75 
 
 
4. Some new prerogatives acquired by courts 
 
The specific ambition of the Supreme Court of Canada was to unify common 
and civil law in the first half-century of its operation, which it has, however, 
recently renounced, probably for lack of better results than the ones achieved 
until now.76 It has assumed new ones instead, and some of these indicate new 
shades of judicial function with particular prerogatives. In the following, we 
shall pay special attention to them, because they use (or misuse) the authority 
provided by the law when they actually draw from extra-legal sources, the fact 
notwithstanding that they demand indisputable authority for themselves, like the 
one due to decisions taken in law. 
 
a) Unfolding in principles the statutory provisions. The new Code civil de 
Québec (January 1, 1994), awaited and prepared for long (wasting the masterly, 

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 Melkevik: ibid. 
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 See, e.g., Entre droit et technique. Enjeux normatifs et sociaux (dir. Côté, R.–Rocher, G.), 
Montréal, 1994. 
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 Lajoie, A.: Avant-propos. In: Lajoie, A.–Brisson, J. M.–Normand, S.–Bissonnette, A.: Le 
status juridique des peuples autochtones au Québec et le pluralisme. Cowansville, 1996. 
 
75
 Laperrière, R.: À la recherche de la science juridique. In: Le droit dans tous ses états. La 
question du droit au Québec, 1970–1987. Montréal, 1987. 515–526, quotation on 524. 
 
76
 Glenn, H. P.: Le droit comparé et la Cour suprême du Canada. In: Mélanges Louis-
Philippe Pigeon. Ottawa, 1989. 197. 
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albeit belated commentary of the old code77 as mere bogus paper), actually 
anticipated the dawn of the new era. Sharply opposed to classical tradition—as 
set forth by the president of the office devoted to the old code’s revision78—, 
it was from the very beginning drafted as “temporal, relative, variable, 
consecrating (…) a certain manner of thought, a certain manner of life, at a 
given time in the history of a people”; moreover—as announced also before the 
code entered into force—, the period for which it was foreseen, might prove 
even surprisingly short.79 
 Its drafters aimed at the consolidation of jurisprudential developments since 
the earlier code as de lege lata addenda, on the one hand, and its codificational 
integration with newly formulated de lege ferenda doctrinal ideas, on the other. 
At the same time, also some balancing and value- and interest-representing 
function was also assumed. After all, the first internationally acclaimed per-
formance of post-modern codification has halted halfway,80 by codifying without 
making the law rigid. 
 Nonetheless, this may perhaps offer a model for the private law codification 
launched by the European Union as well. It seems anyway as if the Canadian 
codifyer were aware of the fact that what was achieved was hardly more than the 
reconstruction of the dilemmas and conditions of mid-18th-century Europe, 
undertaking also tasks normally performed through judicial processes. 
 This is why the outstanding Canadian comparatist could proudly declare—
not denying the need for continuous national legal development either—that, 
back in his time, 
 
“Savigny may have been right (…) but (…) codification may not be the 
obstacle to this process that Savigny saw it to be (…: for) contemporary 
codes may not represent the type of code that Savigny and others had in 
mind.”81 
 

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 Quebec Civil Law. An Introducton to Quebec Private Law (ed.: Brierley, J. E. C.–
Macdonald, R. A.) Toronto, 1993. lviii + 728 pp. 
 
78
 Crépeau. P. A.: Les lendemains de la réforme du Code civil. Canadian Bar Review 59 
(1981), 625 et seq., quotation on 626–627. 
 
79
 Gaudet, S.: La doctrine et le Code civil du Québec. In: Le nouveau Code civil. 
Interprétation et application (1993), 223–240. 
 
80
 Cf. note 36. 
 
81
 Glenn, H. P.: The Grounding of Codification. University of California Davis Law Review 
31 (Spring 1998) 3, 765–782, especially 782. 
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b) Constitutionalisation of issues. The way of procedure developed in the 
United States82 has already penetrated Hungary and the Central and Eastern 
European region as well. In Canada, it was the constitutional review to be 
carried out by the Supreme Court to implement the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982) that gave an opportunity to this. The chance was taken by 
the courts with “enthusiasm”; moreover, in the hope of extending the scope of 
civil liberties, they were soon to cover private law cases as well.83 However, the 
mere prospect of statutory provisions being put aside so that ordinary courts can 
directly apply principles of charters in their own interpretation, has amounted to 
a change of legal practice as well. “Conflicts of interests now tend to be framed 
as conflicts of rights, and the Court is expected to adjudicate.”84 
 This development encounters both criticism and fears of the politicisation of 
judicature—as the book-title The Charter Revolution and the Court Party may 
illustrate this85—: after all, practice has already proven that “the Charter serves 
merely as a blank cheque in the hands of the judges”.86 The criticism is 
reminiscent of the indignation against the Supreme Court of the United States, 
actually re-writing the Constitution with no specific authorisation.87 

 
82
 The subjection of the decisions of state judges (as state-acts) to the Bills of Rights took a 
start half a century ago [Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)], growingly covering the field of 
state private law with regard to the elected nature of judicial office [New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964)]. 
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 Hogg, P. W.: The Law-making Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: Rapporteur’s 
Synthesis. The Canadian Bar Review (March–June 2001), 171–180, especially 172. The 
moderate degree of even an explosive “enthusiasm” in a well-balanced state—in contrast with 
the almost infantile self-asserting fury of the Constitutional Court activism in Hungary in the 
first nine years since its inception—appears from the fact that a total of 64 statutory provisions 
(not complete laws!) were struck down in as many as 18 years, in addition to a much larger 
number of governmental actions by police officers or government officials. Cf. Monahan, P. J.: 
The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21st century. In: ibid., 374, note 2. 
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 Ibid., 179. 
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 E.g., Morton, F. L.–Knopff, R.: The Charter Revolution and the Court Party. Peter-
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relations” J.-F. Gaudrealt-DesBiens : Les Chartes des Droits et Libertés comme loups dans la 
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juridique québécoise. In: Transformation de la culture juridique québécoise. 83–119, quotation 
on 108. Cf. also Bégin. L.: Le Québec de la Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés et la 
critique de la politisation du juridique. In: ibid., 153–165. 
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 Mandel, M.: La Charte des droits et libertés et la judiciarisation du politique au Canada. 
Montréal, 1996. 107. 
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 Cf. chiefly Bork, R. H.: The Tempting of America. The Political Seduction of the Law. 
New York–London, 1990. xiv + 432 and Slouching towards Gomorrah. Modern Liberalism and 
American Decline. New York, 1997. xiv + 382 {reconsidered by the author in ‘Önmagát 
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 Press cuttings are also thought-provoking. One of them, entitled Supreme 
Self-restraint, reads as follows: 
 
“Canadians have been outraged as the courts have used the Charter to 
tweak or abolish dozens of laws, including the abortion law, the Lord’s 
Day Act, restrictions on pornography and voluntary school prayer, and 
laws that kept incompetents from fighting fires”.88 
 
Such and similar examples of criticism are finally followed by remarks from the 
United States, according to which this is but the order of values of some self-
appointed individuals imposed upon the community, without having ever been 
confirmed by any democratic voting procedure. For instance, according to the 
article Out-of-control Judges Threat to Rule of Law, 
 
“Instead of upholding the law as defined by precedents and legislative 
enactments, judges now routinely change the rules of law to accord with 
their own personal political preferences.”89 
 
Imposing values upon the community by the mere force of judicial authority, 
only supported by a narrow intellectual elite but without any democratic assess-
ment, may easily end in counter-effects. For the politicising of judicature may 
prompt democratic voters with legitimately elected legislative and executive 
institutions to react, by treating the judiciary with its partisan views in a 
genuinely politicised way, as a political institution. The obvious danger of this 
was already formulated by some propheting justices. 
 
“Only judicial independence will suffer if we continue to push the consti-
tutional envelope as we have over the past 20 years. An overridden public 
will in time, demand, and will earn, direct input into the selection of 
their judges as they do with their legislative representatives. There will 
be renewed calls for a supplementary process wherein their judges’ 
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performance, even the continuance of their employment (as it will be 
characterized) can be periodically reviewed.”90  
 
c) The Supreme Court as the nation’s supreme moral authority. It has been 
observed during the last decade that the Supreme Court of Canada is not only 
willing to rely on authorial opinions but, besides widely using legal doctrine, it 
also growingly draws from mostly mainstream philosophical considerations as 
normative foundations.91 Thereby it inevitably takes a stand on political and 
moral philosophical issues as a partisan forum, for, in fact, 
 
“The Supreme Court has, since 1982, taken a one-sidedly praetorian 
position in favour of liberal philosophy and ideology, which is a break 
with formerly prevalent pluralism. What we can see is thus an attachment 
to one single philosophy [of, e.g., John Stuart Mill, Dworkin or Rawls, as 
the author of the quotation adds—Cs. V.], with any other aspect ruled out 
at the same time.”92 
 
Obviously, no one has entitled the Supreme Court to elevate itself to ethical 
heights using nothing but its competence of decision.93 The circumstance itself 
that in most debated topical questions dividing society (like euthanasia, abortion 
or in vitro fertilisation), it declares itself to be the highest forum of indubitable 
authority,94 implies—despite any short-term effects and actual influences— the 
long run threat for the Supreme Court itself to make its own position sensibly 
undefendable and vulnerable. 
* 
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The scale of globalisation witnessed in Canada, target of the present case study, 
is not at all unfamiliar in the European Union either, especially not after the 
decision was taken a decade ago to prepare a codification of private law, 
common at least in basic principles. In both cases, the main point is to re-
consider the law’s normative material in a way somewhat released from 
nationally positivated self-restriction when searching for a kind of trans-national 
cultural community. By gradually eliminating the law’s substantivity, legal self-
identity is mostly preserved in a rather procedural sense. Naturally, all this 
involves a change in the concept of, approach to and even traditional techniques 
in law, eventually also leading to a change of character with consequences and 
perspectives utterly unforeseeable in details for the time being. 
 Although by far not as a sine qua non, yet globalisation may nevertheless 
issue in “sustainable development” to be accompanied by the preservation of 
some kind of “sustainable diversity”, in the form of the increasing reciprocal 
action of all great legal cultures and traditions of the human kind with the 
mutual utilisation of shared sources for inspiration.95 
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